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VATICAN II
ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
MSGR. JOHN P. KLEINZ *
N 1948 the United Nations adopted a Universal Declaration of the
Rights of Man. The World Council of Churches issued its
Declaration on Religious Freedom at Amsterdam in 1948 and again
definitively at New Delhi in 1961. Both proclaimed the individual
person's human and civil right to form his own conscience according
to his religious convictions and to determine his relationship to other
churches.
In 1965, at the end of the Second Vatican Council, another inter-
national organization, the Roman Catholic Church, promulgated its
own Declaration on Religious Freedom. Its Latin title, from the
first three words, is Dignitatis Humanae Personae. Its subtitle already
restricts its scope: "On the right of the person and of communities
to social and civil freedom in matters religious." Its central thesis
is: "It is an injustice done to the human persons, and to the order
laid down for men by God, if a man is denied the free exercise of
religion in society; saving a just public order."
All three declarations propose essentially the same juridical prin-
ciple. American lawyers might want to translate the European term
"juridical" as "constitutional guarantee." This principle is that every
man has an inalienable personal right to determine his own religious
attitudes within the limits of public order without any coercion on
the part of civil authorities.
There is a sense in which Americans might be tempted to remark
that one of the first things they learned about the American way
of life is that since 1791 this principle has been written into the
First Amendment of the Bill of Rights of their Constitution. Indeed,
the three international declarations merely repeat what is the common
consensus of much of the modern world. Before the United Nations'
and the World Council's statements of 1948, religious liberty had
been guaranteed by more than fifty nations and since that time,
* M.A. (1942), Ph.D. (1944), Catholic University; Chairman, Department of
Philosophy, Pontifical College Josephinum, Worthington, Ohio.
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fifty more of the nations emerging during
the past two decades have done the same.
The bishops of Vatican II, whose final
vote for the Declaration was 2308 to 70,
were aware of this consensus. In noting
the "signs of the times" (a phrase they
used in almost every document they
passed), they began their first paragraph:
A sense of the dignity of the human
person has been impressirng itself more
and more deeply on the consciousness of
contemporary man. And the demand is
increasingly made that men should act on
their own judgment, enjoying and making
use of a responsible freedom, not driven
by coercion but motivated by a sense of
duty. The demand is also made that
constitutional limits should be set to the
powers of government, in order that there
may be no encroachment on the rightful
freedom of the persons and of associa-
tions.
This demand for freedom in human
society chiefly regards the quest for the
values proper to the human spirit. It
regards, in the first place, the free exer-
cise of religion in society. [#1]'
No previous Council of the Church
had spoken of religious freedom. Vatican
II turned to the subject for two reasons
especially. One was the violations of that
freedom under Communist regimes. The
other was the fact that in modern times
1 The text of the Declaration on Religious Free-
dom used in this article is in THE DOCUMENTS
OF VATICAN II, 675 (Walter Abbott ed. 1966),
introduced and annotated by John Courtney
Murray, and with a Protestant response by
Franklin H. Littell. Fr. Murray has also
annotated the text of the Declaration for an
edition published by The John LaFarge Institute
(1966). (Note that the numbers in brackets
refer to the suggested reading list.)
this right to religious freedom was in-
creasingly recognized.
The Declaration which followed those
first lines on the dignity of man uses only
a few thousand of the 103,000 words of
the sixteen documents of Vatican II.
Compared to the greater themes of the
longer and more fundamental Constitu-
tions, it may even be called a minor issue
at the Council. But on December 7,
1965, at the end of the Council, Pope
Paul VI could tell the statesmen of the
world that it was "one of the major
texts." As a symbol of the development
of doctrine, as a frank answer to Amer-
ican Protestants who had asked for a
clear statement from the highest authority
in the Catholic Church, for the American
bishops and their theological experts who
had worked unceasingly to have it passed,
for American Catholics in a pluralistic
United States, and surely for readers of
a journal called THE CATHOLIC LAWYER,
the Declaration on Religious Freedom
must rank as one of the most significant
achievements of the most momentous
Catholic event of the twentieth century.
My purpose here is the modest one of
introducing it to American Catholic law-
yers by tracing some of the historical,
political, philosophical, and theological
implications of the Church's stand on
religious liberty today. I shall treat, first,
the development of the doctrine for the
past century and a half, then attempt to
define precisely what the Council meant
by religious liberty, and at the end briefly
discuss its paramount importance for the
rapidly developing spirit of ecumenism in
the United States.
The Development of the Doctrine
Pope John XXIII drove the word
"aggiornamento" into the consciousness
of the whole world as a key to the pur-
poses he hoped to achieve in calling the
Council. One of the Council's finest ex-
ercises in aggiornamento was the Declara-
tion on Religious Freedom which Pope
Paul VI promulgated on December 7,
1965. It reflects a climate of opinion that
is new in conciliar debate. It could only
have been written at this stage of the
evolution of the Church's growing aware-
ness of its own nature and the develop-
ment of its doctrine.
The bishops at Rome looked at the
structures and practices of the Church in
a spirit of reform and even remorse; they
were far more open to the concept of the
development of doctrine than one would
suspect from the theological textbooks
they had studied. The Declaration on
Religious Freedom is a prime example.
It has broken the mold of a static and
rigid conception of religious freedom that
had prevailed for the past 150 years in
the Church. That conception had
aroused the suspicions of the non-Cath-
olic world and had led to accusations of
"Machiavellianism" against the Church.
Happily, we are at the end of an era
now. The Council, as it did in other
important areas of the Church's life and
doctrine, realized that it was no longer
possible to freeze a developing doctrine
of religious liberty at a certain point in
its history. It has been said that the
bitter controversies which the Declaration
evoked through three sessions of the
Council arose less because of its contents
13 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1967
than the theory of doctrinal development
implicit in it.
In an important paragraph in the final
version, the bishops claim that the
Church is faithful to the teachings of
Christ and the apostles "when she recog-
nizes and gives support to the principle
of religious freedom as befitting the dig-
nity of man and as being in accord with
divine revelation," but they go on im-
mediately to apologize for the periods in
her history when that principle was
violated:
In the life of the people of God as it
has made its pilgrim way through the
vicissitudes of human history, there has
at times appeared a way of acting that
was hardly in accord with the spirit of
the Gospel or even opposed to it. [#2]
Admittedly, then, the theology of re-
ligious freedom through the centuries has
been conditioned by history. There is
space here for only a glance at thd his-
tory of the doctrine since 1800, but with-
out that history one cannot understand
the breakthrough into the modern world
which the Declaration achieved. 2
2 For a basic survey of the recent theological
development, see JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, THE
PROBLEM OF RELIGIOuS. FREEDOM (1965) and
Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES '503 (1964). For the
historical background, a basic work is- M.
SEARLE BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN IN-
QUIRY (1945). ''See also 1 J. LECLER, S.J.,
TOLERATION AND THE REFORMATION (1960); J.
LECLER, S.J., THE Two SOVEREIGNTIES: A
STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE (1951). Under the sponsorship of
the World Council of Churches, A. F. Carrillo
de Albnornoz has written a fair-minded ac-
count, in ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND RELIG10JS
LIBERTY (1959).
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The beginnings of the modern world
in which the Church wished to make
herself relevant were in the political, eco-
nomic, scientific, religious, and ideological
revolutions at the start of the nineteenth
century. The profound changes which
these revolutions introduced into the
Western world were a threat to the type
of Catholic culture in which the Church
had lived for over a thousand years. The
response of the Church was negative. It
tried to preserve, as far as possible, the
traditional forms in which it had lived so
long. A theological consensus, defended
by a Papacy that was increasingly cen-
tralized at Rome, crystallized in a deci-
sion by the Church to divorce herself
from a developing modernity which
seemed incompatible with the state of
Catholic doctrine at that time.3
A minority of Catholic intellectuals
protested this static stance of Catholic
philosophy and theology and warned that,
if the revolutions continued to develop,
the Church would find herself more and
more isolated and irrelevant. The West-
ern world of science, philosophy, and
culture would evolve without the influ-
ence of the Church. The minority voices
pleaded that Catholic thought should in-
corporate what was positive and good in
the exploding modern scene. A whole
series of condemnations and anathemas
during the nineteenth century, notably
3 In his recent article, Have We Loved the Past
Too Long, Leslie Dewart (115 AMERICA 798
(1966)) speaks of the "hellenization of the
Church" in this regard, and expands his thesis
in the controversial THE FUTURE OF BELIEF
(1966). His historical analysis has not gone
unchallenged. See 116 AMERICA 424 (1967).
the Syllabus of Errors of 1864, was the
answer from Rome.
Historically, it seems impossible that
the Church could have made any other
decision. The new ideas were urged with-
in a framework of philosophies of nat-
uralism and secularism from which it was
difficult to extricate them, given the static
theology of the age. And the Church-
State doctrine of the time, when the
Church was allied to some of the most
powerful nations of Europe, made any
new theories of religious freedom and
separation of Church and State seem like
dangerous innovations.
One of the scholars who protested the
standpat policy of the Church in France
was a priest, Hugues-Felicite' Robert de
Lammenais. He called for a "liberalism"
in France that would separate Church
and State, proclaim full religious liberty
for all, and defend a democratic reform
of society against the Monarchists. There
were few who followed him, and the
tragedy of Lammenais, a man before his
time, was completed in the condemnation
of his doctrines in two encylicals of Pope
Gregory XVI, Mirari Vos in 1832, and
Singulari Nos in 1834.
In Mirari Vos, his inaugural encyclical,
Pope Gregory was harsh in his condem-
nation of any change in the Church's
position on religious liberty:
We come now to a source which is,
alas!, all too productive of the deplorable
evils affecting the Church today. We
have in mind indiflerentism, that is, the
fatal opinion everywhere spread abroad
by the deceit of wicked men. . . . From
this poisonous spring of indifferentism
flows the false and absurd, or rather the
mad principle, that we must secure and
guarantee to each one liberty of con-
science; this is the most contagious of
errors.
4
In 1864, the encylical Quanta Cura of
Pope Pius IX, who called liberalism the
"error of the century," carried as an ap-
pendix the famous Syllabus of Errors.
Some of the "errors" condemned were:
15. Every man is free to embrace and
profess that religion which he, led by the
light of reason, thinks to be the true
religion . ..
76. The abolition of the civil power
which the Apostolic See possesses would
be extremely conducive to the liberty and
prosperity of the Church.
77. In this age of ours it is no longer
expedient that the Catholic religion should
be the only religion of the state, to
the exclusion of all other cults whatso-
ever.
78. Hence, in certain regions of Catholic
name, it has been laudably sanctioned by
law that men immigrating there be al-
lowed to have public exercises of any
form of worship of their own. 5
Obviously, these condemnations whizh
are so out of spirit with the declarations
on Ecumenism and Religious Freedom at
Vatican II must be understood within the
historical context of the times and eval-
uated after reading the many papal docu-
4Aubert, Liberalism and the Church in the
Nineteenth Century, TOLERANCE AND THE
CATHOLIC 49 (tr. George Lamb 1955). See also
Aubert, Religious Liberty from "Mirari Vos"
to the "Syllabus," 7 CONCILIUM 91 (1965); E.
HALES, Pio NONO ch. 7 (1954); E. HALES, THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD ch..6
(1960); E. HUGHES, THE CHURCH AND THE
LIBERAL SOCIETY (1961).
5 H. DENZINGER, THE SOURCES OF CATHOLIC
DOGMA 437 & 442 (translated by Roy J. De-
ferrari 1957).
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ments which were quoted in the footnotes
of the Syllabus to explain the reason for
the condemnations. But just as obviously,
there has been a tremendous development
of the doctrine of religious freedom.
Pope Leo XIII took the first steps to-
ward healing the breach between the
Church and the Europe of his day, not-
ably in the workingman's encylical,
Rerum Novarum, in 1891. He wanted,
he said somewhere, to push the Church
into the twentieth century and advised
French Catholics to accept the Republic.
But on religious liberty, in his famous
encyclical on the State in its relation to
the Church (Immortale Dei, 1885), Leo
still looked back to the golden days of
medieval unity in the past rather than
forward to the future. Within his his-
torical perspective, "he could not but call
for a return to a Christian unity once
possessed, to an ecclesiastical obedience
once rendered, to the matrix of a culture
once fertile of Christian forms." 0
During the Modernist crisis in the pon-
tificate of Pope St. Pius X, there could
hardly be any advance in ecumenism and
tolerance of religious freedom, but, in
1939, when the great papal diplomat
Eugenio Pacelli became Pope Pius XII,
the way was open to new developments.
In his Christmas messages and especially
in an address to the Fifth National Con-
OJ. C. Murray, Church and State at Vatican
I1, 27 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 583 (1966). This
article analyzes two conciliar documents,
Declaration on Religious Freedom, and The
Church in the Modem World, and finds that
the "relevant principles have been stated with
a new purity, previous confusions of the his-
torical and doctrinal have been ruled out.
Id. at 606.
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vention of the Union of Italian Jurists
(Ci riesce, December 6, 1953) 7 with its
detailed analysis of "toleration," Pope
Pius XII was reading the "signs of the
times" aright in his realistic assessment
of the place of the Church in the modem
world. Ci riesce abandoned the retro-
spective view and the medieval dream of
his predecessors.
In the nineteen-sixties, the teaching
Church under Pope John XXIII, Pope
Paul VI, and Vatican Council II con-
firmed without the hesitancies of the past
what the theologians had been saying for
some time: that freedom of religion
means not merely a toleration of error
and evil but that it is a natural right of
every man. The "neutrality" of the State
is no longer condemned as indifferentism
and the recognition of religious freedom
for every man is advocated as necessary
to the dignity and freedom of man.8
Between the end of the first session of
Vatican II and the beginning of the de-
bate on the Declaration on Religious
Freedom in the second, two important
statements were made. In Pacem in Ter-
ris (1963), Pope John XXIII wrote, un-
der the rubric "rights of conscience," that
"every human being has the right to wor-
ship God according to the right norm of
his own conscience and to profess religion
publicly and privately." And on Sep-
7 Ci riesce, 52 CATHOLIC MIND 244-51 (1954).
Cf. Cardinal Lecaro, Religious Tolerance in
Catholic Tradition, 58 CATHOLIC MIND (1960).
8 Cf. Roger Aubert, La Liberte religieuse du
Syllabus de 1864 a nos jours, PROBLEMES
CHRETIENS SUR LA LIBERTE RELIGIEUSE (1963).
9 Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII, PACEM
IN TERRIS, § 14. The key phrase, "right norm
of his own conscience" is the recta conscienta
tember 29, 1963, in his magnificent ad-
dress opening the second session of the
Council, Pope Paul VI spoke of the many
seats at that assembly that were vacant
and asked:
In what conditions does religion exist in
these territories? . . . What displeasure
to see that in certain countries religious
liberty, like other fundamental rights of
man, is being crushed by principles and
methods of political, racial, or anti-
religious intolerance! 10
As the bishops of Vatican II assembled
on November 19, 1963, to hear Bishop
Emile de Smedt of Bruges, Belgium, in-
troduce the first schema (draft text) of
the Declaration on Religious Freedom,
the contrast between 1864 and 1965
could hardly have been greater. Instead
of the condemnations of religious freedom
by the Popes of the nineteenth century,
they had heard two Popes of the nine-
teen-sixties proclaim that religious free-
that has been discussed in Catholic theology
for centuries. For an account of the different
theological interpretations see the commentary
on the Declaration by Louis JANSSENS, FREE-
DOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(1966). He is especially interesting in his
analysis of the interpretations by St. Thomas
Aquinas and Francis Suarez. Cf. Eric D'Arcy,
CONSCIENCE AND ITS RIGHT TO FREEDOM
(1960).
V) Pope Paul VI, Opening Address at the
Second Session, COUNCIL DAYBOOK & VATICAN
II, SESSION 1 AND 2 143, 149 (1965). The
Paulist Press in their Deus paperback series has
published some of the most important speeches
in the council hall in the debate on religious
liberty; COUNCIL SPEECHES OF VATICAN II (ed.
Kuing, Congar, O'Hanlon 1964); THIRD SES-
SION, COUNCIL SPEECHES OF VATICAN I (ed.
Leahy, Massimini 1966).
dom is not merely the lesser of two evils
to be tolerated for the sake of avoiding
greater evil; it was a strict right, and to
violate it is injustice. That right was
claimed not merely for Catholics but is
based on the objective truth of a person's
belief and it is tied to a man's conscience.
It did not merely cover a man's internal
beliefs; it extended to the public profes-
sion of his faith.
Before we turn now to an analysis of
the definition of religious freedom form-
ulated in the Declaration of Vatican II,
we should realize that not all the ambi-
guities and varying interpretations of the
past have disappeared. The lines of argu-
ment for religious freedom in the Dec-
laration are not clear and sharp. We
have to remind ourselves, as Father John
Courtney Murray implies in the title of a
book of essays on the Declaration he
edited, that the theological discussion be-
hind the now clearly acknowledged right
of religious liberty is not an end but a
beginning.
The Definition of Religious Freedom
The term "religious freedom" can
mean many things, and its meaning will
vary with the special interests of those
who use it. The focus of interest will
change for the ecumenist, the analyst of
Church-State relations, the historians of
various epochs, the political scientist, the
constitutional lawyer, and in discussions
of freedom within the Catholic Church
itself.
The Council's Declaration on Religious
Freedom reflects some of these ambigui-
ties, especially in the line of arguments
used to defend it. In general, it may be
said that American experts who influ-
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enced the document advanced juridical
and political, but not purely pragmatic,
arguments in its defense, while the theo-
logians of Europe, with the exception of
Jacques Maritain, were interested almost
exclusively in grounding the right on bib-
lical and theological arguments. Carrillo
de Albornoz summarized the two ap-
proaches in another context when he said
that the American approach is based on
the conviction that, being one of the
"human rights," freedom of religion has
no specific problems of its own and can
be satisfactorily dealt with juridically,
canonically, and politically. The Euro-
pean approach also grants that religious
freedom is one of the "human rights,"
but a right with its own special character,
since it is immediately based on the ab-
solute relationship between God and
man."
These two approaches are evident in
the background of the various formula-
tions of the Declaration at the Council as
they emerged from the floor debates and
the committee revisions. Before analyzing
them briefly, it would be good to give an
overall view of the contents of the final
Declaration as a whole.
In its introduction, the Declaration
grounds the right to religious freedom in
man's intrinsic dignity as a human per-
son. Because of man's increasing aware-
ness of this dignity, the problem of his
religious freedom is raised in new terms
today and, therefore, the Council feels
that it must make a specific declaration
on the subject. It is responding to the
"signs of the times."
11 Cf. Petrus Huizing, S.J., Religious Freedom:
A Bibliographical Survey, 18 CONCILIUM 119
(1966).
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The first half ("The General Principles
of Religious Freedom") is a general ac-
count of religious freedom and sketches a
philosophical argument for it. The em-
phasis is restricted; the concern is with
the juridical and social order and the
validity of that order, of the human, and
therefore civil right to the free exercise
of religion. Government should respect
and favor the religious life of the citizen-
ry but should not command or inhibit
religious acts. In preventing abuses, it
must act according to religious norms for
the preservation of public order.
The rational argument holds that man
has an obligation to seek the truth and
embrace it where it is found, especially in
religious matters. Because of human dig-
nity, man in society must be free from
all constraint, legal or extra-legal, in his
pursuit of truth, in his religious belief,
worship, and practice, both privately and
publicly. "Religious freedom . .. has to
do with immunity from coercion in civil
society." This leaves the traditional
teaching of the moral claim of revelation
and of Christ's Church on man and the
human community explicitly intact. The
document speaks of the "moral duty of
men and societies toward the true religion
and toward the one Church of Christ."
Then the norms for the legitimate limita-
tions of this right, because of "public
order," are given. The obligation of gov-
ernments to protect and foster religious
freedom is urged, a number of constitu-
tive rights implicit in the basic right are
enumerated, and the implications for
churches and religious communities are
developed.
The second half ("Religious Freedom
in the Light of Revelation") is a rich
and succinct statement of the central im-
perative that man's response to God must
be free. It reconsiders the essential as-
pects of religious freedom under the light
of Christian revelation. The Church
claims religious freedom and indepen-
dence for herself; she must live in an at-
mosphere conducive to the acceptance of
God's revelation of the Christian faith.
The Council deplores the oppressive pol-
icies of some governments.
This claim is not made for the Catholic
Church alone. The conclusion is an ex-
ercise in aggiornamento. Given the pres-
ent historical situation, religious freedom
is necessary for the peaceful and decent
coexistence of individuals, nations, and
the political communities of the world
society. At the end there is a note of joy
that most nations in their constitutions
have declared religious liberty to be a
civil right and in the fact that it is recog-
nized in important international docu-
ments. There is a note of sadness, too,
and the grim fact is noted that there still
exist regimes in the world under which,
even though freedom of religious worship
receives constitutional recognition, the
powers of government are engaged in the
effort to deter citizens from the profession
of religion and to make life difficult for
religious communities.12
A glance at the history of the two
years of debate and revisions and rewrit-
ing of the draft texts will help us under-
12 For this summary of the Declaration, see
D'Arcy, Freedom of Religion, 6 NEW CATH.
ENCYC. 107; Trisco, Vatican Council 11, 14
NEW CATH. ENCYc. 563-72. See also J. C.
Murray, The Declaration on Religious Free-
dom, 15 CONCILIUM 3 (1966).
stand why the definition of Religious
Freedom which finally emerged at the
Council was such a limited one. In at-
tempting to explain these limitations, I
have drawn heavily on the many articles
and commentaries which Father John
Courtney Murray, S.J., Professor of
Theology at Woodstock College and Edi-
tor of Theological Studies, devoted to the
subject before, during, and, especially,
since the Council. He was a preeminent
proponent of the American point of view
and took a leading role in formulating
the various versions of the Declaration.
When Bishop Emile de Smedt of
Bruges, speaking for the Secretariat for
the Promotion of Christian Unity which
prepared the text, introduced the conciliar
debate on religious freedom on Novem-
ber 19, 1963, he presented the first draft
as the fifth chapter of the Decree on
Ecumenism and the line of argument was
influenced by that fact. His relatio (a
technical term for an introduction of the
content and methodology of a draft text)
was a declaration of "freedom of con-
science" and had the pastoral purpose of
instructing Catholics in their conduct of
ecumenical activities. The first schema
stressed the moral, not juridical, aspects
and its line of argument was theological
in presenting Catholic doctrine of the
freedom of the act of Christian faith.
Toward the end, a juridical definition was
introduced.
After a rewriting, a second schema
was debated publicly during the third ses-
sion from September 23 to 25, 1964. It
was presented as an appendix to the
decree on ecumenism and followed the
basic line of argument in the first text.
The right to religious freedom was still
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grounded on the obligation a person has
to follow the dictates of his conscience,
but a new concept of the "rights of the
person" and an argument from human
dignity began to emerge as fundamental.
The debates brought a basic confusion
into the document. A rather drastic re-
vision led to a third text which was sub-
stantially the same as the sixth text which
was finally promulgated. It defined re-
ligious freedom as a juridical concept; the
confusion began to clear because of the
omission of some theological lines of
argument which were not yet settled and
still subject to further debate and clari-
fication by theologians.13
When the Declaration was published in
its final form at the end of 1965, its
definition of religious freedom was re-
stricted, for the most part, to the juridical
and political meanings of the term, al-
though some of the confusion caused by
the different emphases of Anglo-Saxon
and Continental approaches remains. The
definition now is written in the same
sense in which constitutional lawyers in-
terpret the right to religious liberty in the
American constitution. "[H]ere," asserts
Father Murray, "it was on solid ground.
The definition is commonly accepted, and
13 John Courtney Murray has traced the thread
of the debate through the last three sessions
of the Council in his essay, The Declaration
on Religious Freedom: A Moment in its
Legislative History, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN
END AND A BEGINNING 15 (1966). For longer
accounts, one may consult the works of XAVIER
RYNNE, THE SECOND SESSION 223-34; THE
THIRD SESSION 24-31; THE FOURTH SESSION
31-53. The last two DAYBOOKS OF THE COUNCIL,
published by NCWC, reprint in some detail
the course of the debate through the last
three sessions.
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it is not only technically correct from a
juridical point of view, but also unex-
ceptional from a moral point of view." 14
Before any further exploration of the
Declaration's definition, it would be use-
ful to follow Bishop de Smedt's relatio
as he employed the ancient logical tech-
nique of prefacing the definition of what
something is by first explaining what it is
not. When he introduced the first draft
in 1963 he seemed anxious to remove
some of the bitterness and confusion from
the debate by explaining that the term
"religious liberty" was used in the docu-
ment in a very restricted sense and that
it should not be stretched to cover other
aspects of freedom.
First, he said, the term did not mean
religious indiflerentism. "When religious
liberty is defended, it is not asserted that
it is proper for man to consider the re-
ligious problem according to his own
whim without any moral obligation and
decide for himself according to his own
will whether or not to embrace religion."
Next, the term did not mean laicism:
"Nor is it affirmed that the human con-
science is free in the sense that it is as it
were outside the law, absolved from any
obligation toward God." Laicism was a
theory introduced by Continental Euro-
pean opponents of the Church in uphold-
ing a principle of religious liberty which
spoke of "freedom of conscience" and
"freedom of cult." As they advocated
these "freedoms," they were ideological,
not juridical, statements of religious lib-
erty and meant that the individual con-
14 J. C. Murray, The Declaration on Religious
Freedom: A Moment in its Legislative History,
supra note 13, at 27.
science is absolutely autonomous. The
theological implication was that religion
was a purely private affair, irrelevant to
any of the public concerns of the political
community. In current Catholic condem-
nations of this attitude in the United
States, the term "secularism" is used to
identify this ideology.1 5
Bishop de Smedt then explained that
the document did not wish to identify
religious freedom with doctrinal relativ-
ism: "Nor is it said that falsehood is to
be considered on an equal footing with
truth, as though there were no objective
norm of truth." In an analysis of the
development of doctrine on this subject
within the Church, Pietro Pavan re-
marked that one of the two central
themes (the other is the dignity of man)
constantly recurring is this insistence on
the existence of an objective moral order,
essentially unchangeable but with innum-
erable gradations in its concrete applica-
tion. The Declaration did not ultimately
base the right to religious practice on an
argument from "freedom of conscience"
(it does not use this term anywhere),
possibly because the phrase is so often
used to imply that "I have a right to do
what my conscience tells me to do, sim-
ply because my conscience tells me to do
it." This would be subjectivism (the cur-
rent word is "situationism") and implies
that in the end it is my own conscience,
and not objective truth, which determines
15 See, e.g., The Annual Statement of the
Bishops of the United States on "Secularism,"
November 14, 1947, reprinted in OuR BIsHoPs
SPEAK 137 (Huber ed. 1952). See #4 of the
Declaration, where "secularism" is implicitly
condemned. Supra at 102.
what is right or wrong, true or false. 16
What, then, did the Declaration on
Religious Freedom define?
The doctrinal substance of the Declara-
tion is stated in two paragraphs at the
beginning:
This Vatican Synod declares that the
human person has a right to religious
freedom. This freedom means that all
men are to be immune from coercion on
the part of individuals or of social groups
and of any human power, in such wise
that in matters religious no one is to be
forced to act in a manner contrary to his
own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be re-
strained from acting in accordance with
his own beliefs, whether publicly or pri-
vately, whether alone or in association
with others, within due limits.
The Synod further declares that the
right to religious freedom has its founda-
tion in the very dignity of the human
person, as this dignity is known through
the revealed Word of God and by reason
itself. This right of the human person
to religious freedom is to be recognized
in the constitutional law whereby society
is governed. Thus it is to become a
civil right. [#2]
This definition of religious freedom as
a human and, therefore, civil right, is
phrased negatively. It is a "freedom
from" and not a "freedom for." This
puts it into the tradition of the American
Bill of Rights, which does not affirm that
a man has a right to believe what is false
or to do what is wrong, but does guar-
antee immunity from coercion in religious
matters. "Neither error nor evil can be
the object of a right, only what is true
16 Bishop de Smedt's relatio during the second
session is printed in COUNCIL SPEECHES OF
VATICAN 11, supra note 10, at 237-54.
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and good. It is, however, true and good
that a man should enjoy freedom from
coercion in matters religious." 17
The right, or moral claim, which every
man can make on every other man-
individuals, groups, political and social
powers-is here said to be twofold: no
man can be forced to act contrary to his
religious beliefs (Catholic teaching has
always held this) and, secondly, no man
can be forcibly restrained from acting on
his beliefs, "whether privately or public-
ly." There is a clear advance here; the
right to public worship by non-Catholic
religious groups had not been acknowl-
edged by the older Catholic writers on
religious liberty. It might be said that,
for the first time, the Anglo-Saxon con-
cept of religious liberty and the American
principle of separation of Church and
State have been clearly acknowledged in
an official document from the highest
Catholic sources.
John Courtney Murray, the chief
spokesman at Rome for what has been
called the "pragmatic" approach of the
Declaration and the principal drafter of
the version of the document debated dur-
ing the fourth session, summed up the
intent of the Declaration, as it was finally
promulgated, for an international theolog-
ical conference at Notre Dame in March,
1966:
The conclusion is that the doctrine of
17 J. C. Murray, in his notes to the text in
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 11, supra note 1.
Pietro Pavan, one of the chief writers of the
social encyclicals of Pope John XXIII, has
written of the definition in the Declaration in
The Right to Religious Freedom in the Con-
ciliar Declaration, 18 CONCILIuM 37-52 (1966).
VATICAN II
the Declaration forms an organic whole.
All of it hangs suspended from the su-
preme principle of the dignity of the
human person. Inherent in this dignity
is the exigence that a man should act
on his own initiative and responsibility,
not under coercion, but from inward
motivation, by his sense of duty toward
the transcendent order of truth and mor-
ality. This exigence in turn founds the
political principle that the freedom of
the person is to be respected as far as
possible and restricted only in cases of
necessity. The equality of this exigence
in all men, who are equal in their dignity
as human persons, founds the further
juridical principle of the equality of all
citizens before the law. And from these
two principles in conjunction two sets
of conclusions follow with equal imme-
diacy. The first juridical conclusion is
that the full immunity of the human
person from coercion in religious matters
is the object of a genuine human right.
The corresponding first political conclu-
sion is the duty of government itself to
respect this right and to ensure respect
for it in society. The second juridical
conclusion is that the exercise of the
right to religious freedom is to be as
free as possible. And the second political
conclusion is that government or legal
limitation of the exercise of the right is
warranted only by the criterion of neces-
sity.18
Some commentators on the Declaration
are unhappy with the emphasis on the
juridical and political aspects of religious
freedom which Murray finds (and helped
to insert) in the document. Their objec-
tions are not to the idea of religious
liberty as such but to the method of
38J. C. Murray, The Declaration on Religious
Freedom, VATICAN II: AN INTERFAITH APPRAISAL
576 (ed. J, Miller, 1966).
presenting it. They reflect the funda-
mental concern for a more theoretical
approach which European members of
the drafting committee had upheld. But
certainly the Declaration is not a purely
pragmatic statement, and just as surely
the dialogue between the theologians is
not ended, but hardly begun. It seems
that all the commentators would agree on
that.
Murray's own satisfaction at the pri-
mary emphasis given the juridical and
political aspects of religious freedom in
the Declaration is part of his conviction
that the positive values inherent in re-
ligious belief, profession, and practice,
however great their religious, moral, and
social significance, are juridically irrel-
evant. He holds that a harmony exists
between religious freedom in the juridico-
social sense and Christian freedom in the
various senses of this latter concept as
they emerge from scripture and from the
doctrine of the Church. The Declaration,
he says, merely suggests that the two
kinds of freedom are related; it does not
undertake to specify more closely what
their precise relationship is.19
19 For Father Francis J. Canavan, S.J., looking
at the Declaration from the viewpoint of a
political scientist, the argument in the Declara-
tion fails to appreciate fully the political
dimension. He thinks that the ancient "prin-
ciple of consent" would have strengthened it
at one point, and at another, full use of the
juridical principle of "equality before the law."
He also sees the scheme as tinged with sub-
jectivism, wants even more emphasis on the
political order, and more development of the
relationship between religious freedom and con-
stitutional government. Canavan, S.J., The
Catholic Concept of Religious Freedom as a
Human Right, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN END
AND A BEQINNINQ 65 (ed. J. C. Murray 1966).
Pope John XXIII wanted the Council
to be pastoral, and the Declaration on
Religious Freedom is a practical pastoral
document. This does not mean that it
has no doctrinal content. There is in it
an ethical doctrine of religious freedom
as a human right, both personal and col-
lective. There is a political doctrine
about the role of governments in relation
to religion in the state. There is also a
theological doctrine which claims freedom
for the Church, and this principle regu-
lates the relations between the Church
and the socio-political order. [# 4]
The Declaration on Religious Liberty
did not intend to be a full discussion of
the theology of religious freedom, nor did
it treat fully the whole question of "free-
dom of conscience," as that term was
used in Catholic theology in the many
earlier treatments of a person's right to
religious liberty. To put that liberty into
the far wider context of a whole theology
of freedom would have been more profit-
able, perhaps, but much more difficult. 20
The development of the doctrine has not
yet reached the stage where it could be
done handily.
For some books and articles reporting and
commenting on the Declaration by European
authors, a handy list is found in Petrus Huiz-
ing's bibliographical survey cited in 18 CON-
CILIUM (1966). He also lists many articles
that appeared during the 'Council. Especially
intere'sting is a sympoium edited by Murray
in FREEDOM AND MAN (1965), with essays by
men like Hans Kfing, Karl Rahner, Piet
Fransen, C. Malik, and Daniel Callahan.
20 Murray has listed "four major themes" which
he said would have to be developed for a full
theology of religious freedom. Murray, The
Declaration on Religious Freedom, 15 CON-
CILIUM 3 (1966). See also J. MURRAY, VATICAN
11: AN INTERFAITH APPRAISAL 577-85 (ed. J.
Miller, 1966), . _:p
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At the beginning of the discussion in
the Council, the argument for religious
freedom was basically theological. The
first drafts argued from freedom of con-
science in religious matters to the jurid-
ical right to religious liberty. The second
draft argued from human dignity and
man's highest good to a constitutional
demand for liberty. These theological
arguments were largely the work of Euro-
pean thinkers influenced by contemporary
philosophies of personalism and existen-
tialism. In several of his commentaries,
Father Murray shows his uneasiness
about the validity of some of these argu-
ments which proceed from the order of
ethics and theology and from conscience
and human dignity to the juridical order
of constitutional guarantees. Father Mur-
ray opposed the Europeans who helped
prepare the draft when their arguments
proceeded too quickly on an abstract,
metaphysical plane of deduction from an
eternal unchangeable nature of man.
It would seem that John Courtney
Murray, who has spent a theological life-
time researching and writing on the his-
torical development, the constitutional
statements, and the theology of religious
freedom, was able to draw on the tradi-
tion of American law and pragmatic ap-
plication of the law to furnish a valuable
corrective to a too abstract treatment of
religious liberty. Again, one can sense
his satisfaction in all the commentaries
he has written that the final version of
the Declaration was more a beginning
than an end of the dialogue on religious
freedom in which the Church has en-
gaed the modem world,
VATICAN II
The: Impact in America
When he first introduced the text
which eventually became the Declaration
on Religious Liberty, Bishop Emile de
Smedt of Bruges listed four reasons why
the Council should clearly explain and
defend the right of all men to religious
liberty. The first reason was simply that
it was true that this freedom is a human
right-and the Church should defend the
truth. Next, religious freedom is an in-
tegral part of the dignity of man and it
was up to the Church to proclaim it
openly at a time when almost half the
human race was deprived of religious
liberty by atheistic materialism of various
kinds. Thirdly, he said, this is a world
of religious pluralism and the Church
must light the way to peaceful coexistence
for men of different religious beliefs or of
no belief at all. And finally, there was
ecumenism:
Many non-Catholics harbor an aversion
against the Church or at least suspect her
of Machiavellianism because we seem to
them to demand the free exercise of re-
ligion when Catholics are in a minority
in any nation and at the same time re-
fuse and deny the same religious liberty
when Catholics are in a majority.
Catholics, who are a minority in a
pluralistic United States where the prin-
ciples of the Declaration on Religious
Freedom had been commonplace for al-
most two centuries, will appreciate that
last reason most of all.
American Protestants and Jews for the
most part have acknowledged that their
Catholic fellow citizens staunchly upheld
the right to religious liberty and defended,
with their lives at times, the America1
system of separation of Church and State.
They knew that Catholic spokesmen, be-
ginning with Bishop John Carroll in co-
lonial times, welcomed the provision of
the first amendment which forbade the
the congress to make any law favoring
the establishment of one religion over
another. They knew that American Cath-
olic historians and theologians were real-
istically aware that, despite the record of
periodic intolerance against their Church,
she had grown and prospered under the
first amendment and were convinced that
a system of separation of Church and
State was a better guarantee for the
growth and freedom of their Church than
any European system of union of Church
and State.
Through all the stress and strain in the
conflicts between Protestants and Cath-
olics over such issues as the parochial
schools, Catholics realized that their Prot-
estant and Jewish neighbors did not really
doubt that they were devoted to the con-
stitutional provisions for religious free-
dom for all. But there was always
the suspicion of what Bishop de
Smedt had called "Machiavellianism."
American Jews and Protestants were
legitimately concerned over the fact that
the religious freedom which Catholics
professed and defended in the United
States had never been clearly defined and
defended in official documents from
Rome.
Non-Catholics in the United States did
not reject Archbishop McNicholas of Cin-
cinnati when in 1948 as the chairman of
the Administrative Board of the National
Catholic Welfare Conference he solemnly
promised; "If tomorrow Catholics rora-
stituted a majority in our country, they
would not seek a union of Church and
State. They would then as now uphold
the Constitution and all its Amendments."
But they knew that there were passages
in Pope Leo XlII's encyclical epistle to
the bishops of the United States in 1895
which generously praised the American
government's attitude and laws about re-
ligion, but immediately added:
Yet, though all this is true, it would
be very erroneous to draw the conclusion
that in America is to be sought the type
of the most desirable status of the
Church, or that it would be universally
lawful or expedient for State and Church
to be, as in America, dissevered and
divorced. . . . Catholicity in America is
in good condition, nay, is even enjoying
a prosperous growth ... but she would
bring forth more abundant fruits if, in
addition to liberty, she enjoyed the favor
of the laws and the patronage of public
authority.2 1
There were passages in Pope Leo's
1885 encyclical on "The Christian Con-
stitution of States" which seemed to write
off the American experience as merely
"tolerable," and pages in Catholic text-
books on political science like Ryan and
Boland's Catholic Principles of Politics
which theoretically could advocate the re-
peal of the first amendment while saying
that, realistically, such an act was exceed-
ingly improbable. 22
21 Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII, Long-
inqua (1895). This is reprinted in 12 AMER.
ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 346-56 (1895); J. T. ELLIS,
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY
514-17 (1956).
22 J. RYAN & F. BOLAND, CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICS 315, 320-22 (1947). See also J.
KERWIN, CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON CHURCH ANI
)
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If anything is needed to demonstrate
the development of doctrine from Leo
XIII to Paul VI, it might well be the
glaring difference in tone between such
statements and the sixth section' of the
Declaration on Religious Freedom:
If, in view of the peculiar circum-
stances obtaining among certain peoples,
special legal recognition is given in the
constitutional order of society to one re-
ligious body, it is at the same time im-
perative that the right of all citizens and
religious bodies to religious freedom
should be recognized and made effective
in practice. 23
Here the Declaration which Pope Paul
promulgated in 1965 still holds out the
possibility of some kind of union of
Church and State, but it puts that pos-
sibility in rather weak hypothetical terms
and insinuates that establishment of a re-
ligion by the State, from a Catholic point
of view, is a matter of historical circum-
stance, not of theological doctrine.
There are other important implications
in that paragraph. One is the acknow-
ledgment that there has been a decisive
development of doctrine between the
Syllabus of Errors of 1864 and the Dec-
laration of 1965. This recognition of de-
velopment, here and in other sections of
the Declaration, will have repercussions
in theological thought in many other
areas.
STATE 90 (1960); J. T. Ellis, Church and State:
An American Catholic Tradition, 207 HARPER'S
MAG. 63 (Nov. 1953).
23See Murray's notes to this passage in
Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra
note 1,
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It is more important for our purposes
here to realize that the significant mod-
ification of the traditional attitude on the
relation of Church and State means that
the Church has truly read the "signs of
the times," has acknowledged its minor-
ity position in the modern world, and has
abandoned the "thesis-hypothesis" theory
of the relation of Church and State which
dominated Catholic thought for the past
hundred years. This is the theory implicit
in Leo XIII's encyclicals, in Ryan and
Boland's textbook, and in dozens of
Church-State treatments in the Catholic
manuals up to the present. The "hypoth-
esis" that separation of Church and State
was merely to be "tolerated," especially
in countries where Catholics were in a
minority, has become the "thesis," that
is, the normal situation, the only one that
counts.
The "thesis-hypothesis" doctrine, which
until recently was presented as if it were
an ancient dogmatic principle of the
Church, is really only a hundred years
old. Historians trace it back to an article
in the Jesuit periodical, La Civilta' Cat-
tolica, at the time of the First Vatican
Council, although the idea itself can be
traced back to St. Thomas Aquinas in
the thirteenth century and was extended
to the Protestant churches from the six-
teenth century.24
24J. Lecler, S.J., Religious Freedom: An His-
torical Survey, 18 CONCILIUM 10 (1966). See
M. Bevenot, Thesis and Hypothesis, 15 THEO-
LOGICAL STUDIES 440-46 (1954). G. Weigel,
S.J., The Church and The Democratic State,
27 THOUGHT 165 (1952) makes an interesting
distinction between the static expositors of the
doctrine on Church and State and the dynamic
expositors (Murray's position, which Weigel
As the doctrine appeared in Catholic
textbooks of theology and philosophy for
the past hundred years, the "thesis"
meant the ideal situation of a union be-
tween the Roman Catholic Church and
the State, with the implication that wor-
ship by non-Catholic groups should be
private and limited. The "hypothesis"
meant a situation where the Catholic re-
ligion was in a minority status within a
nation; in that case separation of Church
and State could be "tolerated" for reasons
of expediency. The practical result, as
noted above, was a frequent charge of
"Machiavellianism" against the Church.
Catholics were accused of demanding
freedom for themselves when they were
the minority, but of being unwilling to
extend a genuine freedom to non-Cath-
olics where they were the majority.
The "thesis-hypothesis" issue was an
important part of a rather celebrated con-
troversy between Father John Courtney
Murray and a group of Catholic Univer-
sity theologians at the beginning of the
nineteen-fifties. In response to a series of
articles in which Father Murray argued
that "thesis-hypothesis" was not defined
by the Church as Catholic doctrine, they
wrote that it was a recent innovation and
not truly part of the long tradition of
Catholic doctrine on the issue, and that
the American principle of separation of
Church and State was an equally and,
indeed, more valid theological conclusion.
The American system, in other words,
defends). The abandonment of the "thesis-
hypothesis" position is taken for granted in
Vatican I's PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE
CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD (Gaudium et
Spes) 76.
was not a purely pragmatic device of
expediency for the Church, but could be
stated as a principle in its own right.
The Declaration on Religious Freedom of
1965 is a source of considerable satisfac-
tion to the followers of Father Murray in
his controversy with a rather formidable
and powerful array of American Catholic
theologians.2 5
In 1870, at the time of the First Vat-
ican Council, an editorial in the Catholic
Dublin Review admitted that the editors
did not know for sure just what would
be discussed at the Council, but the one
25 Some of the key articles by Murray in this
controversy were printed in the journal THEO-
LOGICAL STUDIES, which he edits: Freedom of
Religion: Contemporary Orientations of Catho-
lic Thought on Church and State in the Light
of History, vol. 6,. 1945; Current Theology on
Religious Freedom, vol. 10, 1949; The Problem
of State Religion, vol. 12, 1951. Important
also is J. C. Murray, Governmental Repression
of Heresy, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CATHOLIC
THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 26 (1949).
The attacks on Murray's "dynamic" position
made by various "static" professors at Catholic
University (Joseph C. Fenton, Francis Con-
nell) and by George W. Shea and Cardinal
Ottaviani appeared in THE AMERICAN ECCLESI-
ASTICAL REVIEW, volumes 123-28 (1950-53).
Fr. Murray replied in the same journal to Fr.
Shea in the 1951 volume, pp. 327-52. Fr.
Joseph Fenton published The Status of a
Controversy, in the same volume, pp. 451-58.
A good bibliography of the whole controversy
appeared in 1 THEOLOGY DIGEST 173-75 (1953).
Murray's article, This Matter of Religious
Freedom, 112 AMERICA 40 (1965), is a sum-
mary of several talks he gave as a peritus to
the Council Fathers. In PETER AND CAESAR
(1965), E. A. GOERNER, a Catholic political
scientist, wrote a critical study of Murray's
approach and doctrine and the Council's com-
petency and wisdom in speaking on religious
freedom.
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thing they were sure of was that the
"sacred principle" of the union of Church
and State would never be discussed or
denied. A century later, during the Sec-
ond Vatican Council, an editorial in the
American magazine, The Commonweal,
said that "it is absolutely vital that the
Church be on record, in a way that Cath-
olics over the world cannot contravene,
as a firm supporter of religious liberty.
This can only be done by a pronounce-
ment which grounds religious liberty and
the nature of man in faith as a free gift
of God."
Happily, the Church is on record with
her Declaration on Religious Freedom.
She has answered the legitimate questions
of American supporters of religious lib-
erty who had asked for an official inter-
pretation of the Church's view of re-
ligious freedom in the modern world. In
this area, she has responded to Pope
John's call for aggiornamento.
Some Suggestions for Further
Reading for Catholic Lawyers on
"Religious Freedom":
1. Father John Courtney Murray holds
an altogether unique place in the dis-
cussions before, during, and since the
Council. Many other articles in pro-
fessional and popular journals, both
American and European, could be
added to those already quoted--in the
notes. In the Spring, 1952, issue of
THOUGHT (27 THOUGHT 6), Fr.
Victor R. Yanitelli published an an-
thology of his writings in an article
entitled, A Church-State Anthology:
The Work of Father Murray. The
author gives a bibliography as of that
VATICAN II
date. Thomas T. Love, a Protestant
theologian, has written a sympathetic
and understanding synthesis of the
thought of Fr. Murray. LOVE, JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY: CONTEMPORARY
CHURCH-STATE THEORY (1965).
There is a lengthy bibliography of
books and articles containing all the
pertinent material to illuminate the
important controversy in the early
Fifties in this work.
2. 'THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA,
published in 1967, has several valu-
able articles which give a succinct but
comprehensive background on the
,Declaration and its application for
American lawyers. Especially recom-
mended are the following sections:
Vol. 3 Church and State 726-38,
articles by M.R.P. McGuire, D.J.
Herlihy, M.J. Havran and J.N.
Moody.
Vol. 3 Church and State Legal
History in the United States 742-
58, articles by T.O. Hanley, M.J.
Mullaney, Jr., J.C. Polking, and
R.J. Regan.
Vol. 6 Freedom of Religion 107-
14, by E. D'Arcy.
Vol. 6 Freedom of Religion, U.S.
Law of 114-22, by G.E. Reed.
Vol. 13 Freedom of Religion,
Papal Teaching on 352-61, by P.
Pavan.
In the index volume (15) various
cases on the United States Law
of Freedom of Religion are in-
dexed on page 483.
3. Some books worth consulting:
J. MARITAIN, THE TRUE HUMAN-
ISM (1938); THE RIGHTS OF
MAN AND NATURAL LAW (1943);
CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY
(1944); THE PERSON AND THE
COMMON GOOD (1947); THE
THINGS THAT ARE NOT CAESAR'S
(1939).
E. D'ARCY, CONSCIENCE AND ITS
RIGHT To FREEDOM (1961). A
revised and augmented edition
was published in French in 1964.
R.J. REGAN, S.J., AMERICAN
PLURALISM AND THE CATHOLIC
CONSCIENCE (1963).
J.G. KERWIN, CATHOLIC VIEW-
POINT ON CHURCH AND STATE
(1960).
FREEDOM AND MAN (J.C. Mur-
ray ed. 1965).
A.P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE UNITED STATES (1950),
a monumental, three volume
work that has been called "de-
finitive."
T.G. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CON-
CEPTS OF CHURCH AND STATE
(1964).
4. Some useful articles on religious lib-
erty in the United States:
E. Duff, S.J., Church-State in the
American Environment: An His-
torical And Legal Survey, SOCIAL
ORDER, (1960) (published by the
National Jesuit Social Science
Center).
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(1963) with a symposium,
The Meaning of Religion in the
First Amendment, containing the
proceedings of the 1963 First
Amendment Conference.
(Continued on page 266)
VATICAN II
(Continued)
J.A. Hardon, S.J., Cooperation of
Church and State in American
Legislation, 57 THE HOMILETIC
AND PASTORAL REVIEW 309
(1967).
J.A. Hardon, S.J., Cooperation of
Church and State in the Supreme
Court, 57 THE HOMILETIC AND
PASTORAL REVIEW 419 (1967).
J.A. Hardon, S.J., Cooperation of
Church and State in American
Education, 57 THE HOMILETIC
AND PASTORAL REVIEW 523
(1967).
D.R. Russell, English and Ameri-
can Democracy and The Papacy,
72 THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW
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30 (1953-4) (reprinted in THE
CATHOLIC MIND 338 (1954)).
Cardinal Augustin Bea, Religious
Freedom, THE CATHOLIC MIND
4-15 (1964).
Bennet, A Protestant Views Re-
ligious Liberty, 201 THE CATH-
OLIC WORLD 362 (1965).
Canavan, The Declaration on Re-
ligious Liberty, AMERICA, Nov. 20,
1965 at 635. See also Canavan,
Church, State, and Council,
ECUMENISM AND VATICAN II 44-
62 (O'Neill ed. 1964).
Giacchi, Freedom of Religion and
the State, 11 CATHOLIC LAW.
271 (1965).
Sheerin, C.S.P., The Nature of
Relqious Liberty, 201 THE CATH-
OLIC WORLD 356 (1965).
IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS
(Continued)
In seeking to attain the application of
the equal protection clause to the laws on
illegitimacy, the author advocates that, at
one end of the spectrum of legislation,
the illegitimate should be given all the
support rights of a legitimate child. The
other extreme would be paternal affection,
a matter which the author feels cannot be
legislated in the illegitimate's favor. Other
matters of legislation, such as intestacy,
welfare, and the use of the paternal name
would fall somewhere in between.
The author's argument for legal equality
for illegitimates is a convincing one. The
child is an unwitting victim of a situation
over which he could exercise no control.
There seems little justification for punish-
ing him for this fact by giving him second-
class legal rights. Although he will never
be free of social stigma, there is no
sound justification for denying him the
legal rights of all citizens. While Mr.
Krause's explanation of the "real" reason
for discriminatory legislation is somewhat
oversimplified, it seems clear that an il-
legitimate child's rights outweigh other
considerations for such discriminatory
legislation.
